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Abstract 
Fuel subsidy has been the biggest quandaries in Indonesian economy, as it has been 
creating a huge opportunity costs to the economy. The subsidy is implemented to a 
consumer good (i.e. fuels) as oppose to targeted recipients, creating distortion in the 
efficient resource allocation. It was estimated about 70% of the subsidy were received by 
40% of top income households (World Bank, 2007). Although the budget plan for the 
subsidy in 2011 was Rp129.7 trillion or 10% of the GoI annual budget, the actual subsidy 
was Rp160.7 trillion (13.3% of the GoI annual budget). 
Indeed, no individual prefers to lose the subsidy that has been received for many years, 
however the Government of Indonesia (GoI) cannot maintain the subsidy policy on fuel 
price any longer without creating extra budgetary burden. This study use experimental 
approach to seek the most acceptable exit strategy of eliminating fuel subsidy scheme in 
Indonesia based on households’ perspective. 335 subjects participated in the experiment, 
ranging from those who do not own motor vehicle, those who have motor cycle(s) and 
those who have car(s). During the experiment, subjects were given several pair-wise 
choices and chose the most acceptable policy from each pair-wise policy choices. The 
results show that the combination of gradual elimination and earmarked reallocation 
scheme were the most desirable. Subject with very low and low-income background tend 
to be more receptive for sudden elimination of the subsidy in comparison to their 
counterpart from medium and high-income backgrounds.  
Key Word: Fuel subsidy, experimental economics, analytical hierarchy process (AHP), 
preference relation, reallocation of resources.  
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1.	  Introduction	  
Subsidy has been used as a method to internalize positive externalities in the market for a 
particular good.  Ideally, the subsidy is distributed to targeted households. In reality, 
however, subsidy may be given to a particular goods and can be accessed equally by both 
poor and wealthy households. In the context of consumer’s welfare, subsidy to private 
goods creates inefficiency. Subsidy drives consumers to purchase a good cheaper than the 
cost of producing it (Rosen, 2010). Consequently, the subsidy to consumer goods may 
distort income distribution as those who consumed the goods more received more 
benefits of the subsidy. Obviously those who can consume more consumer goods are 
those who are affluent.  
Indonesia and Nigeria have been implementing subsidy scheme to fuel consumption. 
Both countries are oil producers, although since 2005 Indonesia has become net importer. 
Both countries also face similar problems in phasing out the fuel subsidy. The matter is 
no longer an economic policy issues but has extended to socio-economic policy issues 
(Adenikinju, 2008).  
Empirical study regarding this issue attempted to analyze the relationship between 
demand of fuel and the subsidy factor i.e. the amount of subsidy for each unit of fuel. The 
study shows that increase in the amount of subsidy increases the demand of fuel 
(Nwachukwu and Chike, 2011). The result suggests that the effect of subsidy 
significantly affect the behavior of the consumers. 
Indeed the fuel subsidy in both countries have created burden to their economy, however, 
any attempt to eliminate the subsidy will be a complicated agenda. Supposedly their 
government eliminate the fuel subsidy, households with very-low income background 
may not necessarily perceive elimination of fuel subsidy as a loss since they do not 
actually consume fuel. On the other hand, medium and high income households are going 
to experience loss since they consume subsidized fuel on a routine basis. This group of 
households may already have internalized the subsidy into their daily expenditure plan. 
Hence, there is a possibility that this group will give greater response to this loss relative 
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to the other group of households. Status quo4 and endowment effect5 bias may be used to 
explain this phenomenon.   
 
Figure 1. Fuel subsidy in Indonesia, 2000-2010. 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (2010) and Ministry of Finance (2011). 
 
Subsidized fuels, which include premium with RON 88,6 automotive diesel oil (ADO), 
and kerosene, are one of the biggest burden for the Indonesian economy. 7  Fuel 
consumption is one of the highest—if not the highest—subsidized scheme in Indonesia. 
Figure 1 shows that the amount of fuel subsidy in Indonesia has been showing an 
increasing trend during the last decade. Fuel subsidy in year 2010 budget plan accounted 
for Rp58.9 trillion (US$6.93 billion), roughly fifteen-fold of budget plan for natural 
resources conservation, four-fold of spending for health-related programs, and nearly 
twice of budget plan for elementary education system (The Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) allocated 36.5 million kiloliter (or 36.5 billion liter) 
of subsidized fuel in 2010 (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2010).8  
                                                
4 Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988),  Kahneman et al (1991).  
5 Thaler (1980), Kahneman et al (1990, 1991). 
6 RON refers to Research Octane Number. The higher the octane number, the more efficient the engine 
operates. Therefore, higher octane number corresponds to lower emissions. 
7 The government has gradually cut the subsidy for kerosene and expects to fully eliminate the subsidy by 
2011.  
8 MEMR, henceforth. 
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The fuel subsidy has been imposing burden both to the GoI as well as households. For the 
GoI, the policy to subsidize fuel consumption has been a poor policy tool for assisting the 
poor but a crowd pleaser for the wealthy. The subsidy is implemented to a consumer 
good (i.e. fuels) as oppose to targeted recipients or households, creating distortion in 
resource allocation. These subsidized fuels are available at retail gasoline outlets where 
both the wealthy and the poor have equal access to purchase the fuels (IEA, 2008). 
Consequently, those who own more cars and motorcycles (i.e. mid and high-income 
households) have been receiving more subsidies in comparison to those who do not own 
or own limited number of cars and motorcycles (i.e. poor and low-income households).  
The GoI always fulfills the demand of fuel at subsidized price at all costs, since the 
policy has been implemented since President Suharto’s era. It may not be surprising if the 
burden of the fuel subsidy increase every year since the increase of the subsidy may be 
triggered by either increasing demand in fuel consumption, an increase in international 
crude oil price (ICP), or both. The demand of the fuel consumption may be driven by 
economic growth, however, it may also be driven by an increase in the activities of 
smuggling fuel since the price of subsidized fuel in Indonesia is the lowest in South East 
Asia.  
 
Figure 2. Sales volume of nonsubsidized fuel and its retail price, 2010-11. 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (2010) 
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Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs of Indonesia (2008) reported that the 
wealthiest 40% of households enjoyed 70% of the subsidies while the bottom 40% of 
low-income households benefit from only 15% of the subsidies.9 Recent report from 
World Bank (2011) showed a more alarming figure. They reported that 50% of the 
wealthy households consumed a hefty 84% of subsidized fuel with the top 10% 
consuming 40% of total subsidy. The bottom 10%, on the other hand, consumed less than 
1% of total subsidy. Further analysis suggests that two-third of poor households do not 
consume fuel at all.  
Since the fuel subsidy has been implemented to commodity (i.e. fuel) as opposed to 
households, the impacts of the subsidy are as follows: 
1. The middle and high-income households tend to use personal vehicles excessively 
since the operating cost, due to the subsidy, is relatively low for them. There is 
also a concern that the fuel consumption pattern of these classes of households 
became illusionized, as they are not aware that they are being subsidized. As for 
low income and poor households, they receive less benefit from the subsidy as it 
is not a targeted policy.  
2. The ever-increasing fuel subsidy produces budgetary pressures to the GoI. It 
hinders the GoI ability to finance other programs, for instance poverty alleviation 
programs, credits for small and micro enterprises, and provision of infrastructure 
(Beaton and Lontoh, 2010).  The fuel subsidy scheme creates constraints for the 
GoI to implement expansion of more strategic and established programs which 
target the poors, such as PNPM (Community Empowerment Based Poverty 
Reduction Program), PIN (National Vaccination Program), KUR (Credit for 
Small Enterprise, Raskin Rice for the Poor Family), Askeskin (Health Insurance 
for the Poor), and BOS (School Operating Grants).10 Coordinating Ministry for 
People’s Welfare (2008) reported that Rp3.6 trillion (US$423.5 million) 11 
allocation of national budget for PNPM was able to reach 31.92 million poor 
people and created 12.5-14.4 million employment opportunities.  
                                                
9  Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010) reported that there were evidences of fuel subsidies in 
developing countries including Indonesia also find similar pattern. They suggest that, on average, top 
income quintile receives about six times more in subsidies than the bottom quintile. Subsidy benefits to the 
top income groups is even more stark in the case of gasoline; top income quintile receives, on average, 20 
times than that of the bottom quintile, respectively. 
10 These programs are strategic since they have indeed targeted poor people. 
11 It is accounted for about 6.1% of the fuel subsidy in 2010. 
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3. The fuel subsidy could have been reallocated to alternative source of energy, for 
instance gas, solar cell and also geo thermal and related technology which support 
the use of the alternative energy.  
4. The fuel subsidy could have been reallocated to non-energy subsidies such as 
food, vaccines, fertilizer, and public service obligation (PSO). Fuel subsidy could 
have also been reallocated to improve DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus or Specific 
Allocation Fund) which is a transfer of fund from central to regional governments 
to supplement the provision of physical facilities and infrastructure. These 
provisions aim to decrease imbalances among regions.12 
In spite of facing extra budgetary burden due to sharp increase in oil price, the 
GoI is still reluctant to increase price of subsidized fuel. There have been many 
arguments for and against the plan to increase the price of subsidized fuel and to 
eventually eliminate the scheme. The arguments for the plan are based on the fact that the 
GoI has been facing tremendous budgetary pressure due to fluctuations in international 
oil price. The arguments against the plan are based on the adverse impact of the plan to 
the welfare of low-income households.13 Unfortunately, little attempt has been made to 
make an inquiry to low-income households about their preferences on the alternative 
policies to tackle budgetary burden due to a sharp increase in international oil prices.    
Indeed, no individuals or households prefer to lose the subsidy that have been received, 
although indirectly, for many years. On the other hand, Indonesia cannot sustain to keep 
the current policy on fuel price without creating extra budgetary burden. Therefore, 
several exit strategies of eliminating fuel subsidy scheme should be formulated based on 
acceptability rather on the basis of popularity.  
This study aims to seek the most acceptable exit strategy for eliminating fuel subsidy 
scheme in Indonesia based on households’ perspective. It is envisaged that the results of 
this study may be used as guidance to develop a larger-scale research project regarding 
elimination of the fuel subsidy scheme. The results will also be useful as a 
recommendation for policy makers to choose the most preferable policy in eliminating 
fuel subsidy scheme. The research aims to answer the following question: what are the 
                                                
12 Non-energy subsidy and DAK accounted for Rp44.9 trillion (US$5.2 billion) and Rp20.5 trillion 
(US$2.4 billion) in 2010 respectively (Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
13 Indonesia has experience regarding formulation of exit strategy from particular subsidy. Indonesia 
gradually eliminated subsidy on kerosene from 2008. Kerosene was widely used and became essential part 
of low-income households. Nowadays, households have been using gas in replace of kerosene. 
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preferences of the subjects regarding the most acceptable exit strategy for eliminating 
fuel subsidy scheme? 
2.	  Fuel	  Subsidy	  in	  Indonesia	  
There are two types of fuel in Indonesia, which are the nonsubsidized and subsidized 
fuels. Non-subsidized fuels include Pertamax with RON 92 and Pertamax Plus with 
RON 95. These types of fuel are intended for new generations of cars, which require fuel 
with higher-octane count. Pertamina, an Indonesian state-own enterprise which produce 
fuel in Indonesia, as well as multinational firms such as Shell, Petronas, Total, and British 
Petroleum, retail nonsubsidized fuel in Indonesia. Mid-Oil Platt Singapore (MOPS) plus 
tax, retail margin determine the price of this type of fuel, and distribution cost.  
Subsidized fuels in Indonesia include Premium with RON 88 and Solar (Automotive 
Diesel Oil). Premium and solar accounted for two-third of total daily retail of fuel in 
Indonesia. Subsidized fuel in Indonesia is one of the cheapest in the world, accounting for 
approximately 30% of the world market price. The GoI always fulfills the demand of 
subsidized fuel, even if the consumption of fuel and international crude price (ICP) has 
increased substantially. This obligation is due to Article 8 Verse 1 in Laws Number 22 of 
Year 2001, which states that the GoI must guarantee the provision and the distribution of 
gasoline. The implication of this obligation can be analyzed through the calculation of 
fuel subsidy given below (MEMR, 2010). 
Fuel Subsidy = Quantity x (reference price – selling price) (1) 
The quantity refers to the amount of subsidized fuel that is distributed out of Pertamina, 
Indonesia’s state-owned oil company. The selling price for both subsidized fuels is 
pegged at Rp4,500 per liter (Figure 3). The formula for determining the reference price 
is, 
Reference price = [Y x price index of gasoline + (1-Y) x price index of biofuel] + α (2) 
where Y indicates fraction of gasoline volume and α indicates cost of distribution plus 
margin. The reference price reflects the market price for every liter of gasoline and it 
varies according to the Mid Oil Platt Singapore (MOPS). Assuming constant α, fuel 
subsidy will continue to increase with the quantity of fuel distributed by Pertamina, as a 
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response to increase in consumption, and with the ICP reflected by the MOPS. In 
practice, MOPS is attainable only by the government. Therefore, the price of non-
subsidized fuel or Pertamax is commonly used as the reference price to determine the 
subsidy per liter (Figure 3). 
Retail gasoline outlets, especially those in cities of Java, Bali, and Sumatera, already 
market nonsubsidized fuels such as Pertamax with RON 92 and Pertamax Plus with RON 
95. These fuels are intended for middle and high-income households who own certain 
types of cars, which require fuel with higher RON. These classes of households, 
however, still tend to buy subsidized fuel if their cars are suitable to use Premium with 
lower RON. There is a tendency that those who buy nonsubsidized fuel will switch to 
subsidized fuel if the price of nonsubsidized fuel exceeds certain threshold (Figure 2). 
These behaviors are rational since the price of subsidized fuels is about half of the 
nonsubsidized and there is no legal restriction in buying the nonsubsidized fuels. 
Premium-class taxi companies, which operate luxurious cars that ideally use Pertamax, 
decided to alter a particular element of the car in order to be able to use Premium.  
 
Figure 3. Illustration of fuel subsidy per liter, 2010-11. 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (2010). 
 
4000 
5000 
6000 
7000 
8000 
9000 
10000 
Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 
Reference Price Subsidized Fuel 
Fuel subsidy per liter 
 9 
Table 1. Subsidy expenditure in Indonesia, 2005-2012 
Subsidy Expenditure 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Energy         
 Fuel subsidy (A) 95.6 64.2 83.8 139.1 45 82.4 129.7 123.6 
 Electricity 8.9 30.4 33.1 83.9 49.5 57.6 65.6 45 
Total Energy (1) 104.5 94.6 116.9 223 94.5 140 195.3 168.6 
Non-energy         
 Food 6.4 5.3 6.6 12.1 13 15.2 15.3 15.6 
 Fertilizer 2.5 3.2 6.3 15.2 18.3 18.4 18.8 16.9 
 Plant seed 0.1 0.1 0.5 1 1.6 2.2 0.1 0.3 
 
Public Service 
Obligation 0.9 1.8 1 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.8 2 
 Credit assistance 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.9 1.2 
 Tax subsidy 6.2 1.9 17.1 21 8.2 14.8 4 4.2 
 Other subsidy 0 0.3 1.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 
Total Non-Energy (2) 16.2 12.9 33.3 52.2 43.5 52.8 41.9 40.2 
Total Subsidy Expenditure 
(3=1+2) 120.7 107.5 150.2 275.2 138 192.8 237.2 208.8 
Ratio (%) Fuel Subsidy/Total 
Subsidy (=A/3) 79.2 59.7 55.8 50.5 32.6 42.7 54.7 59.2 
Source: Coordinating Ministry of the Economy and Bank Indonesia, 2011.  
 
The consequence of the fuel subsidy policy is the GoI’s budgetary burden. Table 1 shows 
that fuel subsidy expenditure has been continously increasing and in 2011 passed the 
Rp100 trillion mark. The fuel subsidy expenditure has been dominating the total subsidy 
expenditure. Fuel subsidy accounted for at least 54% of total subsidy in 2011, way higher 
than strategic non-energy subsidy such as food, fertilizer, and plant seed, and credit 
assistance. The realization of fuel subsidy expenditure has been exceeding the approved 
number in GoI annual budget at least in the last 2 years. For example, the realization of 
fuel subsidy in 2011 accounted for Rp160 trillion, 23.4% higher than the approved 
number of Rp129.7 trillion. The fuel subsidy expenditure also prone to increase in ICP 
such as those evidenced during 2005 and 2008. 
3.	  Roadmap	  to	  Phase	  Out	  Fuel	  Subsidy	  in	  Indonesia	  
Continuous increase in ICP since 2003 drove the expenditure for fuel subsidy to increase 
by US$8 billion in 2004. The GoI, under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, decided 
to decrease the fuel subsidy twice in 2005. The GoI increased the price of subsidized fuel 
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by 29% in March 2005 from Rp1,810 per liter to Rp2,400 per liter. In the following 
October, the GoI adjusted the price by 114% to Rp4,500 per liter. World Bank (2007) 
recorded that the GoI saved US$4.5 billion and US$10 billion of budget deficit in 2005 
and 2006 respectively. 
The peak of ICP was evidenced in 2008, which accounted for US$147.3 per barrel. The 
GoI expenditure for subsidy inflated to US$17.6 billion from the estimated US$5 billion 
since the GoI set the ICP to US$95 per barrel in the budget assumption (Dillon, Laan, & 
Dillon, 2008). The GoI, again, opted to increase the price of subsidized fuel to 
Rp6,000/liter in May 2012. This was deemed as the perfect momentum to phase out, if 
not to completely eliminate, the fuel subsidy.  
Unfortunately, owing to an attempt to gain support in general election by the ruling party, 
the GoI came to a decision to decrease the price of subsidized fuel from Rp6000 per liter 
to Rp5,500 per liter in December 1st 2008 and to Rp5,000 per liter in December 15th 
2008. Just as the oil price went to square one in 2009, the GoI decided to reduced the 
subsidized fuel back to its original price Rp4500. This policy was driven primarily to 
gain support for the ruling party prior to the general election. The policy has been 
financed by the GoI’s record of a budget surplus owing to decrease in subsidy and 
increase in oil revenue during the time.  By the end of 2010, the ICP price increased 
sharply imposing pressure to the GoI to propose implementation of fuel rationing. The 
plan was to implement closed distribution scheme, in which only targeted individuals 
allowed to purchase subsidized fuels, starting in 2011. The plan, however, did not 
materialize.  
As the oil price had increased sharply in the end of 2010 until the first semester of 2011, 
the price for non-subsidized fuel is about Rp8500/liter. This implies that the price of non-
subsidized fuel is about two fold of that of the subsidized one. There is an interesting 
consumers’ behavior worthy to note. About 10% of nonsubsidized fuel consumers 
switched back to consume subsidized fuel when the price differences between two types 
of fuel exceed Rp3,000/liter in February 2011.  
The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources had established a roadmap to phase out 
fuel subsidy in 2008 as an attempt to reduce the budgetary burden of the GoI. Research 
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consortium of three state universities (i.e. Universitas Indonesia (UI), Institut Teknologi 
Bandung (ITB) and Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM)) also suggests the optimal strategy 
to phase out the subsidy, as mandated by the Law Number 10, 2010. The GoI, as 
expected by many, opted to keep the price of subsidized fuel at the current level mostly 
due to political pressures.  
 
3.  Experimental  Design  
This study used experimental method to seek the most acceptable policy, from 
households’ perspective, in order to eliminate the fuel subsidy. The experiment involved 
335 subjects who come from households with different characteristics. No student was 
allowed to participate in the experiment since their behaviour may not represent the 
behaviour of households. It should be noted that the majority of students in Indonesia are 
fully funded by their parents, thus their consumption decisions are different from 
households.  The classification of the subjects is given as follows: 
1. Households who do not possess motorcycle or car. This group represents 
households with the very-low income background.  
2. Households who only posses motorcycle. This group represents households with 
low-income background.  
3. Households who posses low-budget MPV e.g. Toyota Avanza or Nissan Livina. 
This group represents households with medium income background. 
4. Households who posses cars, which price is twice of those in the third sample 
group. This group represents households with high-income background. 
This classification aims to represent the different types of households with regard to the 
subsidy policy. Several demographic variables, such as income, gender, age, occupation, 
educational attainment, and marital status from these subjects are going to be observed 
from the subjects.  
The experiment consists of three sessions. In the first session, subjects faced 10 questions 
of a pair-wise choices. The subjects to determine which one is more acceptable than the 
others. The questions were formulated from five alternative scenarios of eliminating the 
fuel subsidy and reallocating the resources saved from the subsidy. Each pair-wise choice 
includes hypothetical policy schemes that would have been implemented by the 
government in eliminating fuel subsidy. Hypothetical policy schemes were formulated 
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based on interview reports with the relevant stakeholders. It should be noted that each 
pair-wise choice contains different information.  
In session 2, a similar method was used to ask 45 pair-wise choices which were 
formulated from 10 different alternative policy scenarios. Those five policy scenarios 
which were already asked in session 1 were included in session 2. The strategy to repeat 
some questions in two sessions aims to check the consistency of choices made by the 
subjects.  
The third session of the experiment had been designed to provide compensation for the 
subjects. In this session, 32 pair-wise choices of risky prospects were asked and subjects 
should choose their preferences toward the prospects. This paper focuses on the analyses 
of households’ preferences toward various methods of elimination of fuel subsidy. 
Therefore, the analysis is limited only on the results from sessions 1 and 2, whereas the 
results from session 3 will not be discussed in this article.  
The experiment was conducted in 10 different sessions, each ran for about 60-75 minutes. 
The experiment procedure is shown in Figure 4. The experiment was conducted in the 
computer laboratory in Faculty of Economics and Business Universitas Gadjah Mada. 
The laboratory consists of three rooms comprising a total of 125 computers, although 
during the experiment only two rooms could be used because the other room was used for 
other activities. Experimenter played powerpoint with audio presentation regarding 
details of the experiment, including explanations for each session. The powerpoint and 
audio presentation also include the prologue regarding fuel subsidy, children vaccination, 
mass rapid transportation, and foreign debt. Experimenter offered time for questions and 
answers before the experiment commence.  
ATTENDANCE	  
CONFIRMATION
EACH	  SUBJECT	  PICKED	  
RANDOM	  SEAT
PRESENTATION	  
REGARDING	  THE	  
EXPERIMENT	  AND	  
PROLOGUE
Q	  &A
EXPERIMENT	  
COMMENCE
EACH	  SUBJECT	  PICKED	  
RANDOM	  NUMBER	  FOR	  
RENUMERATION
PLAY	  ROULLETTEEACH	  SUBJECT	  CLAIMED	  THEIR	  PRIZE
 
Figure 4. Experiment procedure 
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After finishing all three sessions of the experiment, subjects reported to the experimenter 
to select a random number. The number selected refer to the prospect that the subject 
played in the third session. Subject’s choice to the randomly selected prospect determine 
the respective prospect that they would be played in a roullette. Subject then played the 
roullette and claimed their prize to experimenter. Subjects who randomly selected a 
prospect without endowment and earned a negative payoff will receive a voucher, 
indicating they do not owe any money to the experiment and will be rewarded with a 
souvenir.  
The policy options for elimination strategies were divided into two groups i.e. those with 
straight elimination plan and those with gradual elimination method (Figure 5). 
Individuals tend to smooth their consumption path and the phenomena were modelled in 
the permanent-income hypothesis of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman 
(1957). From the perspective of households, the elimination of fuel subsidy would be 
considered as a loss that decreases the current income by Z, although it decreases the 
permanent income by only Z/T (Romer, 2006). The impact of the loss depended on the 
length of consumption horizon and the proportion of the loss to total income. 
Consequently, households would not regard this loss as much if Z is only a small 
proportion of their income or  if their horizon is relatively long.14 
Straight elimination will be regarded as a higher decrease in current income relative to 
gradual elimination. This is relevant to households who have relatively high consumption 
of subsidized fuel and higher proportion of fuel consumption in their expenditure plan. 
This type of households may well carefully calculate the effect of both prospects to their 
consumption.  In contrast, households who do not consume subsidized fuels may feel 
indifferent between the two prospects of subsidy elimination.  
 
                                                
14 In this experiment, we assume that households have similar consumption horizon.  
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Figure 5. Set of policy choices 
 
The policy options were also derived with respect to the reallocation scheme of the fuel 
subsidy. There were two schemes of reallocation of resources saved from the elimination 
of the fuel subsidy, namely unspecified (various) government programs or to some 
earmarked programs (i.e. vaccinnes, mass rapid transportation (MRT), etc). Two different 
schemes reflect two different agents, namely, the GoI and the households, who may have 
different utility functions and sometime their utility functions may be conflicting from 
one to another. What the GoI perceive as the first best option of reallocating the fuel 
subsidy fund may not necessarily  perceived as the best option by the households. This 
occurs mainly owing to different utility functions between both parties. The GoI may 
seek to maximize the welfare of the society given certain budget constraint. It will 
allocate its budget to wide-ranging government’s programs, which ideally, each program 
has been supported with evidence-based policy. On the other hand, households seek to 
maximize its utility by consuming observable good or cash. The downside of various 
Straight Elimination or Gradual Elimination 
 
Reallocation of subsidy to other government programs  
 
S 
Reallocation of subsidy 
to fund vaccination for 
all children 
Reallocation of subsidy to 
fund vaccination for all 
children and various 
government programs  
 
Reallocation of 
subsidy to fund 
vaccination for all 
children 
 
Reallocation of subsidy to 
fund development of 
mass rapid transportation 
and other government 
programs 
  
 
Reallocation of 
subsidy to fund 
vaccination for all 
children 
Reallocation of subsidy to 
repay debt and its interest 
and other government 
programs 
  
Reallocation of 
subsidy to repay 
foreign debt and its 
interest 
 
Reallocation of 
subsidy to fund 
development of mass 
rapid transportation 
  
Reallocation of subsidy to fund 
vaccination for all children and 
development of mass rapid 
transportation 
 15 
government programs is that households cannot observe directly the benefit that they will 
receive.15  
One of the policy choices offered in this experiment also include earmarked reallocation 
alternative that is repayment of foreign debt including its interest. Contrary to the 
vaccination and MRT development program, repayment of foreign debt is an indirect 
reallocation program. Households would not receive immediate benefit if the subsidy 
fund were reallocated to repay the debt. Therefore, the decision to choose such alternative 
would be considered as intergenerational decision making process. 
1. The fuel subsidy would be reallocated to child vaccination in several policy 
choices. There are several rationale for choosing this program for the experiment. 
First, child vaccination is a straightforward example of direct reallocation 
program for households. Every households need vaccination program, provided 
that each of them has child(ren). Second, child vaccination program has a 
widespread coverage. Every household, with different income background, are 
able to receive the benefit from vaccination program. Furthermore, the poor and 
low-income households have an equal opportunity to receive the benefit of child 
vaccination program as the high-income households. Third, even though child 
vaccination is a direct allocation program, households cannot experience the 
benefit immediately. The benefit of vaccination, that is prevention of diseases, 
mortality, or disability for a single child, cannot be valued directly into monetary 
unit.  
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends ten vaccines for children, 
which include Hepatitis B, DTP, Polio, BCG, Mumps, Measles, & Rubella 
(MMR), Varicella, Hib, Pneumococcal Conjugation, Influenza, and Hepatitis A. 
The Ministry of Health Indonesia provides free vaccines for children in Indonesia 
through Program Imunisasi Nasional (National Immunization Program). There 
are, however, only five vaccines provided by the program, which are BCG, DTP, 
Mumps, Polio, and Hepatitis B. These vaccines can be easily obtained in 
Posyandu (Integrated Health Service Center) and Puskesmas (Community Health 
Center). A household in Indonesia must incur a cost about Rp1.8 million or about 
US$211 to obtain the other 5 vaccines for a single child (assuming 
US$1=Rp8,500). The cost for each vaccine might be higher than that shown in 
Table 3 since these vaccines has not been produced domestically. 
                                                
15 Subjects will be given pair-wise choices regarding two monetary prospects in the third session. This 
session will determine the amount of money that subjects can earn from this experiment. It is interesting to 
see whether there is a systematic link between particular expected utility function and the choices that 
households make in the experiment.  
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2. The other earmarked policy choice for reallocation of fuel subsidy saved is the 
development of mass rapid transportation (MRT). The growth of Indonesia 
economy has been hindered by lack of insfrastructure, especially for 
transporation. Land transportation sector consumed 47.5% of total fuel 
consumption, higher than industry and electricity sector. Most of the consumption 
of the land sector, which accounted for 88% is contributed by road transport. 
Growth of vehicle also caused traffic congestion such as physical bottlenecks, 
capacity reduction at intersection, loading and unloading of bus on the road, and 
bad driving practice. The quality of public transport is still low in many aspects 
e.g. lack of punctuality, long waiting time and insecurity on board. Public 
transportation still utilizes old vehicles (Ministry of Transportation and Ministry 
of Environment, 2008). 
President’s Decree Number 5 Year 2010 mandated 6 priorities regarding urban 
transportation infrastructure. The mandate calls for improvement in transportation 
system in four metropolitans which are Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, and Medan. 
The mandate also demands the completion of MRT and monorail in Jakarta at the 
end of 2014. Coordinating Ministry of the Economy has been promoting 
megaprojects for development including the establishment of MRT system in six 
metropolitans and their peripheries. These major metropolitans include Jakarta, 
Bandung, Surabaya, Medan, Denpasar, and Makassar. The master plan also 
includes improvement in the current transportation system thus it can 
accommodate the development of train, subway, and feeder bus. 
The MRT would provide benefit to the household irrespective of their income 
background. Establishment of MRT would serve as the optimum alternative to 
private vehicle usage. The most apparent difference is that the coverage of MRT 
is not as vast since the MRT would be built only in several cities and districts. 
Each household would also value the MRT differently. For example, households 
who commute in workdays would value the project higher than those whose 
activities are home-based, such as home industry owner. Additionally, the 
execution of the MRT development would not be as swift as that of the vaccine 
thus households cannot experience its benefits in near future.  
3. Government debt is an integral part of the fiscal policy, which are the 
consequences of the budget to increase people’s welfare. Debt, both foreign and 
domestic, is utilized to finance government’s budget deficit and debt refinancing. 
Debt ratio to GDP has declined from 40.4% in 2006 to 25.2% in 2011, however, 
the outstanding debt still accounts for a very large number. The total debt that the 
GoI owes is accumulation of legacy debts, debts from 1997/98 economic crises, 
and budget deficit financing at least in the last decade. Foreign debts, which 
include debt from World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development 
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Bank, and bilateral debt, are mostly earmarked debt. The debt is used to finance 
strategic project such as poverty alleviation and infrastructure program. Foreign 
debts also include past debts particularly those obtained to ease the economy 
during the 1997/98 crises. 
Foreign debt outstanding accounted for US$67.8 billion in December 2011 or 
34% of the total government’s debt. The debt increased about US$5.8 billion from 
that in 2006. The GoI had to disburse Rp29.9 trillion in 2011 to pay the interest of 
the foreign debt. This payment accounted for 28% of the total government debt 
repayment. The foreign debt interest payment range from Rp25.7 trillion to 
Rp30.3 trillion during 2007-2011 (Debt Management Office, 2011). 
The last policy option is reallocation of the fuel subsidy fund to various (unspecified) 
government programs. In this scheme, indeed, households would not be able to observe 
the types of benefit they would receive. This implies that  households do not observe the 
timing of the disbursement of the program. Unlike the other three alternatives, 
households would find this alternative difficult to internalize into their utility function. 
Furthermore, households’ decision to vote for this alternative depends on their valuation 
of the government i.e. the institution that would actually formulate and execute the 
reallocation program.  
The dataset from this experiment corresponds to households’ preferences regarding the 
acceptability of various exit strategies for eliminating the fuel subsidy scheme. Indeed, 
these valuations, regarding acceptable exit strategies, are subjective in their nature, 
however, they can be formulated into objective data using Analytical Hiearchial Process 
or AHP (Saaty, 2008). Pair-wise choices are aggregated , taking account of the relative 
degree of importance of each alternative in a given pair-wise (Sato, 2009).  
Saaty (2009) argued that this analitical tool is capable of expressing households’ 
preferences quantitatively. These preferences are ordered in a common absolute scale, 
thus the most prefered option can be derived. The outcome of AHP is priority scale of 
households’ preferences. Priorities in this scale are similar to probabilities e.g. a priority 
of 0.50 is twice a priority of 0.25. This scale, however, is unique in the sense that it is 
valid for given policy attributes and factors. This scale reflect the importance of attributes 
in the alternatives (Saaty, 2009). 
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4.	  Complexity	  of	  the	  Experiment	  
Figure 5 shows the pool of subjects management for the experiment. Registrants 
collected from direct registration and internet are grouped according to ownership of 
motor vehicle. Each individual in each group was assigned with an identification number 
which would be used for randomization. Individuals who were selected from the 
randomization process were notified with text messages. The shortcoming of this process 
was that a lot of selected individuals did not come to the actual experiment. Owing to this 
shortcoming, experimenter decided to call all individuals in the pool of subjects to 
participate in the experiment.  
 
POOL	  OF	  SUBJECTS RANDOMIZATION
80%
20%
EXPERIMENT
NEW	  REGISTRANTS
POOL	  OF	  SUBJECTS
RANDOMIZATION
80%
20%
EXPERIMENT
 
Figure 5. Pool of subjects management 
 
Sampling of subjects was the most challenging part during the preparation of the 
experiment. It took about three weeks to distribute brochures and registration forms both 
directly or via internet and collect pool of subjects. Subjects were defined as those who 
live or work within 5 km radius from Faculty of Economics and Business,  Universitas 
Gadjah Mada. Experimenter spread words and brochures for call for participations from 
university and faculties’ employees to community gatherings. Call for participations were 
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also published through emails and internet through experimenters’ website. Individuals 
can either sign up  to be included in the pool of subjects in paper or through the available 
web form. Individuals read the informed consent at registration and they signed the form 
for confirmation and  to be included in the pool of subjects. Individuals also choose the 
desired session from the available sessions set by experimenter. 
We developed a computer application for the experiment. This application includes 
queries for subjects’ basic information details, prologue, and the pair-wise choices for the 
first, second, and third session of the experiment. Subjects were asked to fill in the 
answers in the computer for each pair-wise question by using a mouse. The computer 
application went through two pre-tests for validation of the software and its content  
Although the computer application has been designed and  developed as simple as 
possible for users, as they only need to use click in the mouse, nevertheless some 
complexities still arose during the experiment. Some subjects in group 1, who come from 
very-low income backgrounds, were illiterate, had difficulties in understanding the 
instruction since it was writen in Indonesian language (as their mother tounge is Javanese 
language) or they had difficulties in operating computer. Fortunately, this problems were 
identified four days prior the real experiment. In order to tackle these problems, 15 
students from Department of Javanese Literature, who are fluent in Highly Javanese 
language (Kromo) were recruited as helpers in the experiment. Their tasks were provided 
assistance to subjects who had difficulties in reading the instruction, in understanding the 
instruction and also in operating computer.  
 
5. Results of the Experiment 
The average age of the experiment subjects was 38 years old, indicating that the average 
subjects were within the productive age. Majority of the subjects possessed motorcycle 
only, accounting for 48% of the total number of subjects. The average income for this 
group was Rp1,835,038 or about US$201.7 each month, lower than the total average 
income. Most of the subjects were male, accounting for 60.6% of the total participants 
(Table 2). Note that we combined subjects with car(s) into one group since there were not 
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many subjects who posses more than 1 car. Individuals in this group earn an average of 
Rp6,397,491 or US$710.8 each month, almost ten times of individuals in group one.  
Table 2: Profile of Eperiment Subjects 
Group Age (average) 
Gender   Income 
Male Female 
Total 
(Average)	  
N % N % 	  	  
No motor 
vehicle 42.17 34 36.2 60 63.8 94 Rp677,431 
Motorcycle only 31.97 115 71.4 46 28.6 161 Rp1,835,038 
Car 39.13 54 67.5 26 32.5 80 Rp6,397,491 
Total 38.1 203 60.60% 132 39.40% 335 Rp2,517,399 
Source: calculated from experiment data 
 
Most of subjects obtained 9-12 years of schooling or high-school (41%), followed by 
those who obtained more than 12 years of schooling or higher education (27%). Table 3 
shows that those with lower education level tend to have no vehicle or only motorcycle. 
On the other hand, subjects who went to high school and higher education tend to have 
car(s). 
Table 3: Education Profil of Experiment Subjects 
Group 
Education level 
No formal 
education Elementary 
Junior-
high High-school 
Higher 
education 
N % N % N % N % N % 
No motor 
vehicle 11 11.7 31 33 28 29.8 23 24.5 1 1.1 
Motorcycle only 1 0.6 7 4.3 27 16.8 93 57.8 33 20.5 
Car 0 0 1 1.3 3 3.8 21 26.3 55 68.8 
Total 12 3.6 39 11.6 58 17.3 137 40.9 89 26.6 
Note: elementary school indicates up to 6 years of schooling; junior high indicates up to 9 years of 
schooling; high school indicates up to 12 years of schooling; diploma and higher indicates more than 12 
years of schooling 
Source: calculated from experiment data 
 
Table 4 shows the overall result of the experiment in session 1. The result, in general, 
suggests that subjects focused more on the reallocation scheme rather than the 
 21 
elimination method i.e. gradual or immediate. Indeed, subjects chose gradual elimination 
scheme but the first two choices suggest that earmarked reallocation schemes were an 
important feature in the policy. Direct reallocation scheme through children vaccination 
was also the most desirable among other schemes. Reallocations of subsidy fund to repay 
foreign debt and wide-ranging programs were not preferable for the majority of subjects.  
Table 4: Overall result in session 1 
Rank Policy Choices 
Vector of 
Priority or VP 
(%) 
1 
Gradual reduction of fuel subsidy and the subsidy saved is reallocated 
to finance vaccines for all children and development of mass rapid 
transportation  
30.9 
2 
Immediate elimination of fuel subsidy and the subsidy saved is 
reallocated to finance vaccines for all children and other government 
programs  
22.6 
3 Gradual reduction of fuel subsidy and the subsidy saved is reallocated to finance other government programs  17.6 
4 Gradual reduction of fuel subsidy and the subsidy saved is reallocated to repay foreign debt and finance other government programs.  17.6 
5 Immediate elimination of fuel subsidy and the subsidy saved is reallocated to finance other government programs  11.2 
Source: calculated from experiment data 
  
Table 5 shows the overall result of the 45 pairwise choices in session 2. The result shows 
that subjects, in general, tend to be consistent between session 1 and 2 particularly 
regarding their choices of top 5 priorities. It is shown that the combination of gradual 
elimination and earmarked reallocation scheme, particularly for vaccination and MRT, 
were the most desirable. Subjects chose reallocation to vaccines for all children, which 
offers a more immediate implementation. Immediate elimination with earmarked 
reallocation scheme somewhat made their marks in subjects’ preferences. Not 
surprisingly, immediate elimination and broad reallocation scheme was the least choice 
among experiment subjects.  
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Table 5: Overall result in session 2 
Rank at 
1st 
session 
Rank at 2nd 
session Policy Choices VP (%) 
 1 
Gradual reduction of fuel subsidy and the subsidy saved  is 
reallocated to finance vaccines for all children and other 
government programs 
17.4 
1 2 
Gradual reduction of fuel subsidy and the subsidy saved is 
reallocated to finance vaccines for children and development of 
mass rapid transportation  
16.6 
 3 
Gradual reduction of fuel subsidy and the subsidy saved is 
reallocated to finance development of mass rapid transportation 
and other government programs.  
12.2 
2 4 
Immediate elimination of the subsidy and the subsidy saved is 
reallocated to finance vaccine for all children and other 
government programs  
10 
 5 
Immediate elimination of the subsidy and the subsidy saved is 
reallocated to finance vaccine for all children and mass 
transportation system.  
9.1 
4 6 
Gradual reduction of the subsidy and the subsidy saved is 
reallocated to repay foreign debt and to finance other 
government programs  
8.9 
3 7 Gradual reduction of the subsidy and the subsidy saved is reallocated to finance government programs.  8.4 
 8 
Immediate elimination of the subsidy and the subsidy saved is 
reallocated to finance development of mass rapid transportation 
and other government programs  
6.9 
 9 
Immediate elimination of the subsidy and the subsidy saved is 
reallocated to repay foreign debt and to finance other 
government programs.  
5.6 
5 10 Immediate elimination of the subsidy and the subsidy saved is reallocated to finance other government programs.   5 
Source: calculated from experiment data 
 
Table 6 displays the result of experiment in session 1 for the three groups of subjects. The 
computation shows consistency of choices among the three groups particularly regarding 
the top two priorities and the least preferable. Each group chose earmarked reallocation 
schemes, especially vaccination for children and mass rapid transportation system, and 
gradual elimination as the top priority. It should be noted that, given other three choices, 
immediate elimination with earmarked programs was preferable with considerable 
margin. Each group also deemed immediate elimination with broad-ranging programs as 
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the least preferable policy options. These results were consistent across gender as well as 
across educational attainment.16 
Table 6: Comparison of policy choice across groups in session 1 
Policy choices 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Rank VP (%) Rank 
VP 
(%) Rank 
VP 
(%) 
Gradual; vaccine and 
mass transportation 
system 
1 31.1 1 30 1 31.9 
Immediate; vaccine and 
other government 
programs  
2 24.6 2 21.8 2 22 
Gradual; foreign debt and 
other government 
programs  
3 16.8 4 18.3 4 17.2 
Gradual; other 
government programs  4 14.9 3 19 3 18.6 
Immediate; other 
government programs  5 12.6 5 10.9 5 10.3 
Note: the rank for the group 1 serves as a reference point.  
Source: calculated from experiment data 
 
Cross groups comparison in session 2 suggest consistencies of choices among groups 
regarding the two most and least desirable choices (see Table 7). These groups were also 
consistent in terms of choices being made between session 1 and 2. Those who did not 
posses any vehicle and only motorcycles, i.e. group 1 and 2, chose reallocation for 
vaccination and MRT both in gradual and immediate elimination scheme in the top five 
priorities.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 See Appendix 1 and 2.  
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Table 7: Comparison of policy choice across groups in session 2 
 
Policy choices 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Rank VP (%) Rank 
VP 
(%) Rank 
VP 
(%) 
Gradual; vaccine and other 
government programs  1 16.8 1 17.2 1 18.4 
Gradual; vaccine and mass 
rapid transportation 2 16 2 15.9 2 18.3 
Gradual; mass rapid 
transportation and other 
government programs  
3 11.3 3 11.9 3 13.8 
Immediate; vaccine and 
other government programs  4 10.9 4 10.5 6 8.3 
Immediate; vaccine and 
mass transportation system  5 10.7 6 8.8 7 7.9 
Gradual; foreign debt and 
other government programs  6 8.6 5 9.1 5 8.9 
Immediate; mass rapid 
transportation and other 
government programs  
7 7.4 8 6.8 8 6.5 
Gradual; other government 
programs  8 7.3 7 8.7 4 9 
Immediate; foreign debt and 
other government programs  9 6.1 9 5.7 9 4.5 
Immediate; other 
government programs  10 5 10 5.3 10 4.3 
 
Note: the rank for the group 1 serves as a reference point.  
Source: calculated from experiment data 
 
Those who owned cars, on the other hand, opted options with gradual elimination scheme 
in their top five priorities. There are two possible explanations worthy of note. Subjects 
with cars are those who would experience the most burden if fuel prices increases thus 
they opted for gradual elimination. On the other hand, this group consists of educated 
people who may opt gradual elimination by considering others and knowing that the 
impact of this scheme to the society cannot be negligible. Interestingly, these results are 
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consistent across education attainment where subjects with diploma degree and higher 
opted for gradual elimination.17  
6.	  Conclusions	  
The irrationality of fuel subsidy scheme in Indonesia has received little attention to date 
owing to improper formulation of fuel subsidy scheme and indecisiveness of the 
government. From households’ point of view, the subsidy scheme has been a poor policy 
for assisting poor households. Every stratum of households particularly the wealthy have 
equal access to subsidized fuels. Those who own car receive more subsidies compare to 
those who owns motorcycle or those who does not posses any motor vehicle. As a 
consequnce, the subsidy on fuel has been creating distortion in efficient allocation since 
wealthy consumers benefit from the subsidy the most. World Bank (2011) reported that 
50% of wealthy households consumed 84% of subsidized fuel with the top 10% 
consuming 40% of total subsidy. The bottom 10%, on the other hand, only consumed less 
than 1% of total subsidy.  
The fuel subsidy, on the other side, impose heavy burden on government’s budget. 
Expenditure on fuel subsidy has been continuously increasing in the last decade, passing 
the Rp100 trillion mark in 2011. Expenditure on this scheme undermine expenditures in  
strategic poverty alleviation program. The government increased the price of subsidized 
fuel in 2005 and 2008 but reversed the decision due to political reasons. The government 
remained status quo regarding this matter in the past year albeit budgetary burden 
reached all-time high.  
Fuel subsidy elimination would be regarded as the least preferable policies by majority of 
households. Indeed, no households would prefer to lose the subsidy that have been 
received for many years. It is, therefore, interesting to identify the most acceptable 
policies within these least preferable policies. This study implement experiment approach 
to seek the most acceptable exit strategy regarding elimination of fuel subsidy scheme 
based on households’ perspective. Several exit strategies, including elimination method 
and reallocation scheme, are formulated.  
                                                
17 This result is due to correlation between diploma degree holder and possession of cars.  
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The results of the experiment show that the most acceptable exit strategies were those 
with gradual elimination method and earmarked reallocation scheme, particularly for 
vaccination and MRT. The least acceptable exit strategies were those with immediate 
allocation and undetermined reallocation scheme. These results are consistent across 
sessions and across groups.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Gender comparison of policy choice in session 1 and 2 
Gender comparison of policy choice in session 1  
Policy options 
Male  Female  
Rank VP (%) Rank VP (%) 
Gradual; vaccine andmass rapid 
transportation 1 31.3 1 29.9 
Immediate; vaccine and other government 
programs  2 21.1 2 25.7 
Gradual; other government programs  3 18.7 4 16 
Gradual; foreign debt and other 
government programs  4 17.9 3 16.7 
Immediate;  other government programs  5 11 5 11.7 
Note: the rank for the group 1 serves as a reference point.  
Source: calculated from experiment data 
 
Gender comparison of policy choice in session 2 
Policy options 
Male Female 
Rank VP (%) Rank VP (%) 
Gradual; vaccine and other government programs 1 17.4 1 17.1 
Gradual; vaccines andmass rapid transportation 2 17.2 2 15.4 
Gradual; mass rapid transportation and other 
government programs 3 12.6 3 11.4 
Immediate; vaccine and other government 
programs 4 9.5 4 11 
Gradual; foreign debt and other government 
programs 5 9 6 8.7 
Gradual; other government programs 6 8.8 7 7.7 
Immediate; vaccines andmass rapid transportation 7 8.8 5 9.6 
Immediate;mass rapid transportation and other 
government programs 8 6.5 8 7.7 
Immediate; foreign debt and other government 
programs 9 5.2 9 6.2 
Immediate;other government programs  10 4.9 10 5.2 
Note: the rank for the group 1 serves as a reference point.  
Source: calculated from experiment data 
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Appendix 2. Comparison of policy choice across education level in session 1 and 2 
Comparison of policy choice across education level in session 1 
Policy options 
Elementary 
School 
Junior High 
School 
Senior High 
School 
Higher 
Education 
Rank VP (%) Rank 
VP 
(%) Rank 
VP 
(%) Rank 
VP 
(%) 
Gradual; vaccines and mass 
rapid transportation 1 31.8 1 31.7 1 28.8 1 32.5 
Immediate; vaccine and other 
government programs 2 23.5 2 24.3 2 23.5 2 20.4 
Gradual; foreign debt and 
other government programs 3 17.3 3 16.6 4 16.7 3 19.2 
Gradual; other government 
programs 4 15.7 4 15.7 3 18.8 4 18.3 
Immediate; other government 
programs 5 11.6 5 11.8 5 12.2 5 9.6 
Note: the rank for the group 1 serves as a reference point.  
Source: calculated from experiment data 
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Comparison of policy choice across educationlevel in session 2 
Policy options 
Elementary 
School 
Junior High 
School 
Senior High 
School 
Higher 
Education 
Rank VP (%) Rank 
VP 
(%) Rank 
VP 
(%) Rank 
VP 
(%) 
Gradual; vaccines andmass rapid 
transportation 1 18.6 2 16.4 2 14.6 1 18.4 
Gradual; vaccines and other 
government programs 2 16.4 1 17.5 1 17.2 2 17.4 
Gradual, mass rapid 
transportation and other 
government programs 
3 11.5 3 11.1 4 11.2 3 14.5 
Immediate;vaccines andmass 
rapid transportation 4 10.5 5 9.7 5 9.2 7 7.7 
Immediate; vaccines andother 
government programs 5 10.5 4 10.6 3 11.6 6 7.8 
Gradual;foreign debt and other 
government programs 6 7.8 6 9.1 7 8.7 4 9.6 
Immediate; mass rapid 
transportation and other 
government programs 
7 7.4 8 6.8 8 7.2 8 6.4 
Gradual;other government 
programs 8 7.1 7 7.8 6 8.8 5 8.8 
Immediate; foreign debt and 
other government programs 9 5.6 9 6 9 5.8 9 4.9 
Immediate;other government 
programs  10 4.6 10 5 10 5.6 10 4.5 
Note: the rank for the group 1 serves as a reference point.  
Source: calculated from experiment data 
 
 
 
 
